Philosophy of Mind, (4 Volume Set)

Philosophy of Mind is concerned with fundamental issues about the relation between mind and body and mind and world, and with the nature of the diverse variety of mental phenomena, such as thought, self-knowledge, consciousness, perception, sensation, and emotion. Philosophers of mind explore some of the most perplexing questions about our mental lives. For instance:

• How exactly is the mental related to the physical?
• How is it that our thoughts can reach out to reality and refer to objects distant in time and space?
• What is consciousness? Can it be explained by science?
• How is thought related to language?
• Can animals think?
• Is there some one thing, some special property, that all mental phenomena share that distinguishes them from non-mental phenomena?
• To what extent has the computer helped us to understand the nature of mind?
• Does emotion play a larger role in our rationality that has previously been thought?

For as long as humanity has sought an understanding of its place in the universe, philosophy of mind has been at the
centre of philosophy, but it flourishes now as it has never done before. This new title in the Routledge’s Major Works
series, Critical Concepts in Philosophy, meets the need for an authoritative reference work to make sense of the subject’s enormous literature and the continuing explosion in research output. Edited by Sean Crawford, a prominent scholar in the field, it is a four-volume collection of classic and contemporary contributions to all of the major debates in
philosophy of mind.

With comprehensive introductions to each volume, newly written by the editor, which place the collected material in its historical and intellectual context, Philosophy of Mind is an essential work of reference and is destined to be valued by philosophers of mind - as well as those working in allied areas such as metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language; and cognate disciplines such as psychology - as a vital research tool.

Volume I : Foundations

Chapter 1 : Mind and Matter : Portraits from Memory
Chapter 2 : The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena’ [1874], Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint
Chapter 3 : Knowledge by Description and Knowledge by Acquaintance : Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Chapter 4 : Natural Piety : The Hibbert Journal
Chapter 5 : Mechanism and its Alternatives : The Mind and its Place in Nature
Chapter 6 : On the Idea of Emergence : Part II of ‘Studies in the Logic of Explanation : Philosophy of Science
Chapter 7 : The Concept of Mind
Chapter 8 : The Logical Analysis of Psychology, Readings in Philosophical Analysis
Chapter 9 : Ryle’s Rejection of Mental Acts’ and ‘Acts of Judgement : Mental Acts
Chapter 10 : Brains and Behaviour, Analytical Philosophy
Chapter 11 : Sentences about Believing : Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Chapter 12 : Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes : The Journal of Philosophy
Chapter 13 : Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind : Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Chapter 14 : Is Consciousness a Brain Process? : British Journal of Psychology
Chapter 15 : Sensations and Brain Processes : The Philosophical Review
Chapter 16 : Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories : Review of Metaphysics
Chapter 17 : The Nature of Mind’ [1966], reprinted in David Armstrong, The Nature of Mind
Chapter 18 : Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications : Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Chapter 19 : The Nature of Mental States : originally published as ‘Psychological Predicates, Art, Mind and Religion
Chapter 20 : Mental Events, Experience and Theory
Chapter 21 : Intentional Systems : The Journal of Philosophy
Chapter 22 : Special Sciences : Synthese
Chapter 23 : Naming and Necessity
Chapter 24 : Meaning and Reference : The Journal of Philosophy
Chapter 25 : What is it Like to be a Bat? : The Philosophical Review

Volume II : The Mind–Body Problem

Chapter 26 : Troubles with Functionalism : Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Chapter 27 : Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes : The Journal of Philosophy
Chapter 28 : Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation : The Intelligent Aunties’s Vade-Mecum
Chapter 29 : Minds, Brains and Programs : The Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Chapter 30 : Form, Function, and Feel : The Journal of Philosophy
Chapter 31 : The Myth of Non-Reductive Materialism : Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association
Chapter 32 : From Supervenience to Superdupervenience : Meeting the Demands of a Material World : Mind
Chapter 33 : Language and Problems of Knowledge
Chapter 34 : The Content of Physicalism : Philosophical Quarterly
Chapter 35 : The Rise of Physicalism, Physicalism and its Discontents
Chapter 36 : Levels of Reality : Ratio
Chapter 37 : Realistic Monism : Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism : Journal of Consciousness Studies
Chapter 38 : Emergence : Core Ideas and Issues : Synthese
Chapter 39 : The Real Distinction Between Mind and Body : Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Chapter 40 : What Does the Conservation of Energy Have to Do with Physicalism? : Dialectica
Chapter 41 : The Engines of the Soul

Volume III : Intentionality

Chapter 42 : What Is an Intentional State? : Mind
Chapter 43 : Propositional Content, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language
Chapter 44 : Belief De Re : The Journal of Philosophy
Chapter 45 : Beyond Belief, Thought and Object : Essays on Intentionality
Chapter 46 : Reference : Spreading the Word
Chapter 47 : Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space, Subject, Thought and Context
Chapter 48 : Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes : Quine Revisited
Chapter 49 : Individualism and the Mental : Midwest Studies in Philosophy
Chapter 50 : Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Strategy in Cognitive Psychology : The Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Chapter 51 : Commentary on Fodor’s "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Strategy in Cognitive Psychology" : The Behavioural and Brain Sciences
Chapter 52 : Social Content and Psychological Content, Contents of Thought
Chapter 53 : On What’s in the Head : Philosophical Perspectives
Chapter 54 : A Guide to Naturalizing Semantics, The Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Language
Chapter 55 : Biosemantics : The Journal of Philosophy
Chapter 56 : If You Can’t Make One, You Don’t Know How it Works : Midwest Studies in Philosophy
Chapter 57 : Knowing One’s Own Mind : Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association
Chapter 58 : Individualism and Self-Knowledge : The Journal of Philosophy
Chapter 59 : Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access : Analysis
Chapter 60 : On Knowing One’s Own Mind : Philosophical Perspectives

Volume IV : Consciousness

Chapter 61 : Consciousness and Life : Philosophy
Chapter 62 : Functionalism and Qualia : Philosophical Studies
Chapter 63 : What Mary Didn’t Know : The Journal of Philosophy
Chapter 64 : Materialism and Qualia : The Explanatory Gap : Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Chapter 65 : Phenomenal States : Philosophical Perspectives
Chapter 66 : Consciousness Reconsidered
Chapter 67 : Kripke’s Proof That We Are All Intuitive Dualists
Chapter 68 : The Intrinsic Quality of Experience : Philosophical Perspectives
Chapter 69 : Inverted Earth : Philosophical Perspectives
Chapter 70 : State Consciousness and Transitive Consciousness : Consciousness and Cognition
Chapter 71 : Conscious Experience : Mind
Chapter 72 : Two Kinds of Consciousness, The Nature of Consciousness
Chapter 73 : A Representational Theory of Pains and their Phenomenal Character : Philosophical Perspectives
Chapter 74 : Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? : Mind
Chapter 75 : Is Consciousness Important? : British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Chapter 76 : Facing Up To the Problem of Consciousness : Journal of Consciousness Studies
Chapter 77 : Consciousness : Annual Review of Neuroscience
Chapter 78 : A Third-Person Approach to Consciousness : Sweet Dreams : Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness
Chapter 79 : Individualism and Perceptual Content : Mind
Chapter 80 : Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content? : The Journal of Philosophy
Chapter 81 : Is There a Perceptual Relation?, Perceptual Experience